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T
he Federal Reserve System inﬂuences the economy through its control
of ﬁat money (currency and bank reserves) and the monetary aggregates.
This inﬂuence is more predictable and is easier to observe when there
is a stable relationship between the monetary aggregates and the public’s dollar
expenditure or output. The monetary aggregate M2 in particular has exhibited
a long-term stable relationship with dollar output (Hetzel 1989, 1992; Ireland
1993). In the early 1990s, however, this relationship apparently disappeared.
Over the three-year period 1990Q4 through 1993Q4, nominal GDP grew at an
annualized rate of 5.2 percent, while M2 grew at an annualized rate of only
2.0 percent.
We ﬁrst review regulatory and technological changes affecting ﬁnancial
intermediation that could be reducing the public’s demand for M2. Speciﬁ-
cally, we review the events that have encouraged bank depositors to place their
funds in bond and stock mutual funds, which are not part of M2. We then
investigate whether a version of M2 that adjusts for net ﬂows into bond and
stock mutual funds can reestablish the previous stable relationship with nominal
output growth. This latter aggregate, “shift-adjusted” M2, consists of regular
M2 plus cumulative net inﬂows from households into bond and stock mutual
funds. The article concludes with a discussion of the likely future stability of
money demand.
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
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1. MUTUAL FUNDS
From 1990Q4 through 1993Q4, total bank deposits declined by $25.1 billion,
while bond and stock mutual funds rose by $506.7 billion. (All the ﬁgures
here are for open-end mutual funds, that is, funds whose shares are continu-
ously issued and redeemed.) A regular ﬂow of news stories provides anecdotal
evidence that individuals are taking funds out of small retail CDs, which are
included in M2, and placing them in bond and stock mutual funds, which are
not included in M2. For example, a story in the American Banker (3/22/93)
states:
Banks that sell mutual funds face a major test of their marketing mettle next
month when a huge batch of certiﬁcates of deposit reaches maturity. As much
as $110 billion in CDs will be up for grabs, and with interest rates at the
lowest level in a generation, many customers won’t be looking to roll over
the investments. If recent history is any indication, depositors will pour much
of that money into mutual funds. . . . [C]ustomers are becoming convinced
that rates will remain low for a while and are ready to seek alternatives. . . .
Now they are saying, “I’ve got to get some income.” (P. 1)
Money Market Mutual Funds
The recent growth of bond and stock mutual funds is reminiscent of the growth
of money market mutual funds in the late 1970s. Competition from the mutual
fund industry for bank deposits began in earnest with the cyclical pickup in
money market rates in 1977. Prior to that time, a large rise in market rates would
cause Reg Q ceilings on the rates ﬁnancial institutions could pay on time and
savings deposits to become binding. Holders of small deposits had difﬁculty
ﬂeeing to money market instruments like commercial paper because of the
large denominations of those instruments. By 1977, however, the availability
of money market mutual funds, which pool funds from numerous individuals
for investment in short-term ﬁnancial assets, allowed depositors to avoid Reg
Q and still hold assets that were available in small denominations and that
could be bought and sold with low transactions costs. A good example was
Merrill Lynch’s Cash Management Account, a checkable money market account
introduced in 1977.
Money market mutual funds not only collected deposits from investors, but
also bought the commercial paper of corporations. Large corporations, often
with better credit ratings than banks, found raising funds in this way cheaper
than borrowing from banks. Intermediation that formerly went through banks
now bypassed them completely. The ability of investors to circumvent Reg Q
made inevitable its elimination, beginning with the introduction of all-savers
certiﬁcates in June 1978 and ending with the elimination of the ceiling on
savings deposits in April 1986. The introduction of money market deposit
accounts (MMDAs) in 1982Q4 allowed banks to compete directly with money       
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market funds. The decline in bank intermediation, however, led to a decline in
the public’s demand for M2 deﬁned exclusive of money market mutual funds.
Through the early 1980s, most of the growth in mutual funds occurred
in money market mutual funds. Like other M2 deposits, the shares of money
market mutual funds are available in small denominations. Also, because these
funds hold only short-term securities, their shares are redeemable at par. That
is, they do not ﬂuctuate in value with changes in interest rates. (The weighted-
average maturity of money market mutual funds cannot be greater than 90
days.) As a consequence, including the shares of money market mutual funds
in M2 was straightforward and restored the long-run stable relationship between
M2 and the public’s dollar expenditure and output.
Bond and Stock Mutual Funds
Table 1 shows net inﬂows into bond and stock mutual funds. These funds, as
opposed to money market mutual funds, ﬁrst began to grow signiﬁcantly in
1984. They grew fairly strongly from the middle of 1985 through the middle
of 1987, grew very little from the second half of 1987 through early 1990, and
then began to grow rapidly toward the middle of 1991. The growth of bond
and stock mutual funds in the mid-1980s is not associated with instability in
the relationship between M2 and nominal output. Most of the growth in this
period occurred in bond rather than stock funds and was heavily concentrated in
mortgage-backed securities and, to a lesser extent, in junk bonds. Apparently,
the investors ﬁnancing this growth in bond funds were drawing funds from
large CDs and money market instruments not included in M2.
Table 1 Annual Inﬂows











1984 228.38 39.44 20.63
1985 187.11 22.26 71.09
1986 184.70 53.11 135.54
1987 122.29 16.44 45.72
1988 177.04 19.71 −23.46
1989 97.60 91.02 3.07
1990 11.51 60.79 22.94
1991 −0.57 60.24 96.65
1992 −15.25 16.40 168.90
1993 −9.29 −18.47 241.12
Source: For data on bank deposits and money market mutual funds, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System; for mutual fund data, the Investment Company Institute.   
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In the early 1990s, two forces combined to encourage the large-scale trans-
fer of funds from bank deposits to bond and stock mutual funds. (See Duca
[1992, 1993], Simpson and Scanlon [1993], and Reid and Small [1993].) First,
the ongoing telecommunications and computer revolution continued to lower
the cost to mutual funds of pooling cheaply the savings of investors. The re-
sulting competition from mutual funds for bank deposits prompted a relaxation
by regulators of the constraints imposed by Glass-Steagall, which prevents
banks from underwriting securities. In the early 1990s, that relaxation allowed
banks to market actively bond and stock mutual fund shares. The second force
encouraging deposit outﬂows was the depressed state of the loan market, which
prompted banks to pay low rates on their deposits, both absolutely and relatively
to the returns available on stocks and bonds.
The ﬁrst force, advances in communications and computer technology, re-
duced the cost of maintaining records on purchases and sales and on income
and distributions. It also helped with the recordkeeping required to keep track
of gains and losses for tax purposes. Vanguard Group introduced a series of
U.S. government securities funds that charged a maximum annual operating fee
of 15¢ per $100 (Business Week, 1/18/93), compared with the 23¢ per $100 of
deposits charged for FDIC insurance alone. Also, mutual funds were offered as
families of different kinds of funds, within which investors can easily switch
by telephone. The increased ease in selecting mutual funds was exempliﬁed
in Charles Schwab’s combined offering of almost 250 no-load mutual funds
that do not charge brokers’ fees. The New York Times (3/20/94) described
this concentration of funds in one place as “a ﬁnancial Wal-Mart that enables
investors to trade funds as easily as stocks” (Sec. 3, p. 1).
In the last part of the 1980s, regulators, concerned about the ability of banks
to compete for the public’s savings, increasingly allowed banks to become
involved in the marketing of mutual funds. The Glass-Steagall Act prevents
banks from underwriting mutual fund shares. That is, banks cannot buy the
underlying securities, repackage them in the form of mutual funds shares, and
distribute those shares to the ultimate investors. By the early 1990s, however,
banks or their afﬁliates had acquired the right to perform most of the other
services needed to maintain a mutual fund. They could serve as the investment
adviser. That is, they could select the particular stocks or securities speciﬁed by
the fund’s stated objectives. Banking organizations could also serve as transfer
agent and custodian. That is, they kept records of ownership and of the col-
lection and distribution of interest and dividend income. They also settled the
accounts between buyers and sellers.
In the early 1980s, regulators allowed banks to establish a discount broker-
age service not subject to the geographical limitations of the McFadden Act.
In 1992, the Federal Reserve Board allowed bank holding companies to
provide investment advice along with brokerage services. In 1993, the Ofﬁce
of the Comptroller of the Currency permitted Dean Witter and a subsidiary of    
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NationsBank to form a partnership to sell mutual funds and other securities in
the branch ofﬁces of NationsBank. Also, in April 1993, the Federal Reserve
Board allowed Mellon Bank Corporation, which had already teamed up with the
mutual fund company Dreyfus, to buy The Boston Company, which provided
administrative and advisory services to 84 different mutual funds.
In 1991, a fall in the rate of interest paid on bank deposits, combined
with the ongoing technological and regulatory changes that were facilitating
the creation of mutual funds, encouraged the large-scale transfer of funds from
bank deposits to bond and stock mutual funds. Many retired investors used the
income from bank CDs to support themselves. Especially with the sharp fall
in short-term rates that began at the end of 1990, they moved out of CDs into
bond and stock mutual funds, which promised a steadier cash ﬂow (at the risk
of capital ﬂuctuation). The Wall Street Journal (2/12/93) wrote:
[The yield on] Treasury bills plunged 37% last year. “That was the great T-bill
crash of 1992,” says Laurence Siegel. . . . Investors usually think of stocks
as very risky and bonds as moderately risky. Meanwhile, T-bills, certiﬁcates
of deposit, money market funds and other short-term debt instruments are
seen as virtually risk-free. That’s certainly the case, if all you care about is
ﬂuctuations in price. But if your concern is getting a steady stream of income,
then holding T-bills and rolling them over as they mature is much more risky
than holding stocks or bonds. (P. C1)
By fall 1992, the rate paid on six-month CDs had fallen to about to 3.25
percent, where it remained until early 1994. For all of 1992, the 30-year bond
rate averaged 7.67 percent, while three-month CDs averaged 3.62 percent, an
unusually wide difference of four percentage points. As of February 1994,
savings deposits at commercial banks and savings banks paid on average 2.43
percent (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System statistical release
H.6, “Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits,” March 24, 1994). That level of
short-term rates produced a transfer of funds out of bank deposits into higher-
yielding bond and stock mutual funds.
The immediate cause of the disintermediation from ﬁnancial institutions
was the low rates paid on deposits, which in turn reﬂected weakness in loan
demand. In addition, the need to rebuild capital forced many ﬁnancial insti-
tutions to restrict their asset growth and, indirectly, their deposit growth.
Finally, the well-publicized problems of ﬁnancial institutions with debt
defaults, especially in real estate, beginning in 1989 altered the perception
of investors with small amounts of capital that bank deposits were the primary
safe form of saving apart from savings bonds and Treasury bills. Mutual funds,
in contrast, experienced no such bad publicity.
A survey by the Board of Governors (1993) documented the change in
emphasis in the 1990s by banks from solely attracting deposits to retail
marketing of mutual funds. The Board surveyed 56 large banks nationwide.
All but four of these banks marketed mutual funds to their retail customers.    
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Three-quarters of the banks that marketed mutual funds had sales representa-
tives at their branches. Forty percent of the banks had sales forces with over
50 people. By 1993, customers of Wells Fargo could buy and sell mutual funds
through automated teller machines (The Economist, 9/4/93).
2. SHIFT-ADJUSTED M2
Shares in bond and stock mutual funds possess many of the characteristics of
the deposits in M2. They are liquid and available in small denominations, and
they can be bought and sold with low transactions costs. The existence of these
common characteristics suggests adding shares in bond and stock mutual funds
to M2 to create a more inclusive monetary aggregate that would be unaffected
by transfers between these funds and M2. Bond and stock mutual funds, how-
ever, are not complete substitutes for the time deposits in M2. Fluctuation in
their capital value presents a risk not present with bank time deposits. Also,
they are not suitable for regular small transactions in that each sale of a mutual
fund share creates a capital gain or loss that is taxable.
Fluctuation in capital value makes bond and stock mutual funds unsuitable
for inclusion in a broad monetary aggregate. Consider, for example, the anomaly
that could arise if bond and stock mutual funds were added to M2 to create a
new, more inclusive monetary aggregate. Assume that a rise in money growth
creates an expectation of a future rise in inﬂation. That expectation would
produce a rise in bond yields, which would depress the value of bonds. The
value of an inclusive deﬁnition of money would then fall and give a misleading
message about the thrust of monetary policy. Money growth would fall when
nominal output growth rose.
One way to offset the distortions in M2 produced by bond and stock mutual
funds is to construct a shift-adjusted M2: M2 plus cumulative net inﬂows into
bond and stock mutual fund shares not coming from institutional investors
and not held in IRA/Keogh accounts. The exclusion of institutional holdings
is consistent with the deﬁnition of M2, which excludes money market funds
held by institutions. Similarly, the exclusion of IRA/Keogh accounts reﬂects the
exclusion of these accounts in M2. The shift-adjusted measure also excludes
reinvested dividends. The use of dollar inﬂows to adjust M2 avoids the problem
of changes in the capital value of bonds and stocks.
This construct should not be thought of as a conventional monetary aggre-
gate. The divergence between its growth and M2 growth, however, suggests a
measure of the extent of shifts in the public’s demand for M2. By taking account
of these shifts, it is possible that M2 could again be used as an indicator of the
thrust of monetary policy. Shift-adjusted M2 is analogous to the shift-adjusted
M1 the Fed used in 1981 (Bennett 1982). At that time, an adjustment to M1 was
needed because the incorporation of interest-bearing NOW (negotiable order
of withdrawal) accounts in the deﬁnition of M1 in 1980 and the introduction     
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of these accounts nationwide in 1981 produced an inﬂow of funds into M1
from deposits not formerly included in M1. Shift-adjusted M1 subtracted an
estimate of these inﬂows. Analogously, the suggested shift-adjusted M2 adds
in an estimate of outﬂows from M2 into bond and stock mutual funds. Table 2
lists ﬁgures for conventional M2 and shift-adjusted M2. In 1991 the difference
in their growth rates was only 1.4 percent, but that ﬁgure rose to 1.9 percent
in 1992 and 2.4 percent in 1993.
3. SHIFT-ADJUSTED M2 AS AN INDICATOR
How well does shift-adjusted M2 predict the impact of monetary policy
actions? Shift-adjusted M2 predicts better than unadjusted M2; however, it
does not eliminate all of the unusual reduction in the public’s demand for M2.
Figure 1 uses shift-adjusted M2 per unit of output to predict the price level. (M2
is shift-adjusted starting in 1991.) Assuming that M2 velocity is stable over
time, that is, the ratio of dollar output to M2 ﬂuctuates around an unchanged
value, M2 divided by real output should move with the price level over long
periods of time. (See Humphrey [1989] for a history of the use by quantity
Figure 1 Money per Unit of Output as a Predictor of the Price Level










Shift-Adjusted M2 per Unit of Output
+ Notes: Data are quarterly observations of shift-adjusted M2 divided by real GDP and of the
implicit price deﬂator. Both series are logarithms of the index numbers created by dividing each
series by its 1955Q1 value. Shift-adjusted M2 is M2 plus cumulative net inﬂows starting in 1991
from households into bond and stock mutual funds (non-IRA/Keogh accounts).    
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991 1 3363.53 3365.40 3.85 4.54
2 3380.02 3384.65 6.04 7.08
3 3398.11 3405.88 6.62 7.79 3.89 4.47
4 3409.00 3419.30 3.91 4.83
5 3418.86 3432.99 3.52 4.91
6 3426.64 3444.01 2.77 3.92 4.53 5.64
7 3426.42 3447.19 −0.08 1.12
8 3427.40 3453.14 0.34 2.09
9 3427.51 3458.72 0.04 1.96 1.05 2.46
10 3432.33 3469.06 1.70 3.65
11 3445.36 3486.11 4.65 6.06
12 3455.25 3501.98 3.50 5.60 2.02 3.84
1992 1 3464.09 3519.20 3.12 6.06
2 3483.61 3547.02 6.97 9.91
3 3486.28 3555.74 0.92 2.99 3.97 6.45
4 3481.94 3554.52 −1.48 −0.41
5 3482.07 3560.23 0.04 1.94
6 3477.77 3562.72 −1.47 0.84 0.30 2.11
7 3480.72 3572.35 1.02 3.29
8 3489.43 3587.62 3.05 5.25
9 3496.58 3599.00 2.49 3.87 0.96 3.09
10 3507.46 3610.43 3.80 3.88
11 3510.53 3617.26 1.05 2.29
12 3509.04 3624.41 −0.51 2.40 2.32 3.51
1993 1 3502.78 3624.12 −2.12 −0.10
2 3494.21 3621.75 −2.90 −0.78
3 3494.83 3630.23 0.21 2.85 −1.33 0.89
4 3497.99 3641.85 1.09 3.91
5 3521.86 3674.52 8.50 11.32
6 3528.70 3687.19 2.36 4.21 2.18 4.77
7 3533.56 3700.11 1.66 4.29
8 3535.69 3712.65 0.73 4.14
9 3543.59 3727.09 2.71 4.77 2.46 5.05
10 3545.09 3735.63 0.51 2.79
11 3556.19 3753.27 3.82 5.82
12 3563.11 3765.99 2.36 4.14 1.96 4.20    
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theorists of money per unit of output as a predictor of the price level.) As shown
in Figure 1, M2 per unit of output and the price level do gravitate around each
other. In 1992, however, M2 begins to underpredict the price level, even with
the shift adjustment. By 1993Q4, the underprediction reaches 5 percent.
Figure 2 shows the normally positive relationship between M2 velocity
and the ﬁnancial market opportunity cost of holding M2. The latter variable is
measured by the difference between the commercial paper rate and a weighted
average of the explicit rates of return paid on the components of M2 (Hetzel
1989). An increase in the cost of holding M2 raises M2 velocity by lowering
the demand for M2, and conversely. The shift-adjustment does not restore for
the early 1990s the normal positive relationship between M2 velocity and the
ﬁnancial market opportunity cost of holding M2. Shift-adjusted M2 velocity
should have fallen, but did not.
Figure 3 shows quarterly observations of quarterly rates of growth of shift-
adjusted M2 and nominal output (GDP) over the recent period of instability in
M2 demand. The two series exhibit some common ﬂuctuations. The correlation
between growth in nominal output and growth in M2 is .35. When M2 growth
is lagged one quarter, the correlation is .41. The rise in nominal output growth
Figure 2 The Relationship Between Shift-Adjusted M2 Velocity and the
Financial Market Opportunity Cost of Holding M2















Cost of Holding M2
M2 Velocity (left scale)
(right scale)
+
Notes: The ﬁnancial market opportunity cost of holding M2 is the difference between the rate
on six-month commercial paper and a weighted average of the explicit rates of interest paid on
the components of M2. Shift-adjusted M2 is M2 plus cumulative net inﬂows starting in 1991
from households into bond and stock mutual funds (non-IRA/Keogh accounts). Shift-adjusted M2
velocity is nominal GDP divided by shift-adjusted M2.    
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Figure 3 Shift-Adjusted M2 and Nominal Output Growth





















+ Notes: Data are quarterly observations of quarterly annualized growth. Shift-adjusted M2 is M2
plus net household inﬂows into stock and bond mutual funds beginning in 1991.
during the economic recovery, however, is not matched by the usual rise in
M2 growth. It appears that shift-adjusted M2 continues to contain some useful
information about the effect of monetary policy actions on nominal output, but
less than M2 does before 1991.
Shift-adjusted M2 appears to account for somewhat less than half of the
unusual decrease in the demand for M2. Over the three-year period 1990Q4
through 1993Q4, the annualized rate of growth of nominal output was 5.2
percent, while the annualized rate of growth of M2 was only 2 percent. Over
this same period, the cost of holding M2 (the ﬁnancial market opportunity cost
shown in Figure 2), fell about 1 percent. In the past, that decline would have
produced somewhat faster growth in M2 than in nominal output (a fall in M2
velocity). Appendix B makes these ﬁgures more precise by comparing the pre-
diction errors from a money demand regression estimated with conventionally
deﬁned M2 and with shift-adjusted M2. Using conventionally deﬁned M2, the
overprediction in the rate of growth of real M2 for the years 1991, 1992, and
1993 is 2.6, 3.2, and 4.2 percent, respectively. Using shift-adjusted M2, the
overprediction in each year falls to about 2 percent.
It is possible that there is an explanation for the leftward shift in M2
demand that does not focus on the desire of the public to shift its savings
from the deposits of ﬁnancial institutions to capital market instruments. The
explanations offered, however, have not proven satisfactory. One explanation
offered was that the closing of thrifts by the Resolution Trust Corporation  
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extinguished thrift deposits that had been included in M2. The Resolution Thrift
Corporation, however, stopped closing insolvent thrifts after March 1992 be-
cause of lack of funds. Despite this fact, M2 continued to grow slowly relative
to nominal output. The other explanation offered was that the public was using
M2 balances to reduce its debt. Consumer installment credit, however, began to
grow strongly in 1992Q3. Adding home equity loans to consumer installment
credit results in a typical growth in consumer credit for a period of economic
recovery. This growth implies that the public no longer considered its debt level
excessive. M2 growth, however, did not subsequently revive.
It appears that the leftward shift in M2 demand derives from the public’s in-
creased desire to save with capital market instruments rather than bank deposits.
This change in behavior is driven by the reduction in the transactions cost of
buying and selling capital market instruments and by the availability of these
instruments in small denominations made possible by the pooling of investors’
savings in mutual funds. The failure of the shift-adjustment to account fully
for the leftward shift in M2 demand evidently arises from a failure to account
fully for the outﬂows of M2 deposits to other sources. Indirect conﬁrmation
of this conjecture comes from the Board of Governors’ Surveys of Consumer
Finances (Kennickell and Starr-McCluer 1993, p. 3). Between the 1989 and
1992 surveys, bank deposits as a fraction of households’ ﬁnancial assets fell
from 31.9 to 26.1 percent, or 5.8 percentage points. Mutual fund holdings,
however, rose only 3.2 percentage points, from 14.6 to 17.8 percent. The direct
purchase of stocks and bonds apparently accounted for the remainder of the
decline. Duca (1993) also points out that in 1992 sales of U.S. savings bonds
held for under ﬁve years surged when money market rates fell below the ﬂoor
of 4.16 percent paid on these instruments. It is likely that much of the inﬂows
into these savings bonds came from M2 deposits.
Finally, shift-adjusted M2 does not account for the increase in the use of
tax-sheltered forms of savings in the early 1990s. Governor Lindsey (1994)
reports that in 1993 tax-sheltered forms of income, particularly pension fund
and life insurance reserves, accounted for 70 percent of the net acquisition of
ﬁnancial assets. This tax shifting was probably undertaken in response to the
increase in marginal tax rates in 1991 and 1993. Because the shift-adjustment
made here to M2 does not include deposit inﬂows to IRA/Keogh accounts
or deposit inﬂows from institutional investors, it does not capture the decline
in M2 that occurs when an individual withdraws funds from a time deposit
included in M2 and places them in a tax-sheltered investment. The increased
importance of tax-sheltered savings can be seen by comparing mutual fund
inﬂows in the mid-1980s and in the early 1990s. Over the three years 1985 to
1987, 43 percent of the inﬂows into bond and stock mutual funds went either
into accounts held by institutional investors like life insurance companies or
into IRA/Keogh accounts. This ﬁgure rose to 61 percent over the three-year
period 1991 to 1993 (see Table 3 in Appendix A).    
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4. WILL M2 DEMAND BECOME STABLE AGAIN?
Will the behavior of the public’s demand for M2 become predictable again? In
particular, will the Fed again be able to set targets for M2 growth that can be
reliably related to the desired rate of growth of the public’s dollar expenditure?
The admittedly equivocal answer is, “It could.” The distressed condition of
banks in the early 1990s and the associated low rates of interest on bank de-
posits are not likely to recur. After the completion of the current rechanneling
of saving from the indirect intermediation provided by banks in favor of the
direct intermediation of Wall Street, it is possible that mutual funds will grow
steadily enough to avoid destabilizing M2 demand.
A somewhat different question is whether the Fed will be able to use
M2 again as an indicator of the impact of its policy actions on the behavior
of the public’s dollar expenditure. Even if the public continues to shift funds
between bank deposits and bond and stock mutual funds, a shift-adjusted M2,
by offsetting the resulting ﬂuctuations in M2 demand, could become a useful
measure of the impact of monetary policy. Assuming that a primary reason that
shift-adjusted M2 does not fully account for the leftward shift in M2 demand
is the move toward tax-sheltered savings instruments, then, in the absence
of major future changes in the tax code, shift-adjusted M2 should become a
useful monetary indicator. It could become particularly useful in the event of
a ﬁnancial disturbance causing a large, sudden outﬂow from mutual funds. In
that event, the resulting large changes in conventional M2 would be primarily
noise.
The future usefulness of the monetary aggregates as targets or indicators
also depends upon the tax and regulatory environment that banks will face. The
computer technology that made mutual funds possible also makes it possible
for banks to take deposits off their books in ways that can make it difﬁcult to
measure money accurately. Banks will have an incentive to pursue this tech-
nology as long as they face tax and regulatory obstacles to collecting deposits
that are not incurred by other organizations competing for the public’s savings.
Two major handicaps that banks suffer in competing for the public’s savings are
the prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and the imposition
of a tax in the form of noninterest-bearing reserve requirements. (Goodfriend
and Hargraves [1983] discuss the role that reserve requirements have played
as a tax.) These two institutional features create incentives for banks to lower
the amount of demand deposits and other checkable deposits on their balance
sheets in ways that distort measurement of the monetary aggregates.
In particular, sweep accounts allow banks to avoid the prohibition of
the payment of explicit interest on demand deposits and the tax imposed by
noninterest-bearing reserve requirements. For example, on March 21, 1994, a
large bank advertised in The Wall Street Journal for an account that “auto-
matically sweeps your excess cash into preselected investments daily.” In one   
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version, the bank sweeps balances from a NOW account above a speciﬁed
amount into an MMDA account. Whenever the NOW account falls below a
speciﬁed minimum level, the bank transfers funds from the MMDA back into
the NOW account. (All funds are transferred back in with the sixth transfer
to avoid exceeding the legal limit of six automatic transfers per month from
an MMDA account.) Reid and Small (1993) state that “about a quarter of the
banks selling mutual funds provide retail sweep accounts whereby funds in
a depositor’s account in excess of a predetermined amount are automatically
invested in a money market mutual fund or some other uninsured investment
vehicle” (p. 12).
A group that helps banks design sweep accounts reports the beneﬁts of
offering sweep accounts (Treasury Strategies 1994, pp. 24 and 26):
Reduced Reserves—Money market funds and trust sweeps move customer
funds off balance sheet. Reserves of those deposits are eliminated and the
amount of assets available for investment is increased.
Reduced FDIC premiums—Again, by moving funds out of insured depository
accounts, FDIC premiums are eliminated. This .23% savings is also a beneﬁt
in which both the customer and bank can share.
Banks interested in encouraging fee payment for services and/or removing
demand balances from their balance sheets set target balances and minimum
sweep amounts at zero.
If a bank sweeps funds above a target balance into an MMDA, it does
not affect the behavior of M2, but it does reduce measured M1. M1 has not
been useful as a measure of money in the 1980s because of its high degree of
sensitivity to changes in market interest rates (Hetzel and Mehra 1989). In the
absence of a good measure of the interest sensitivity of the public’s demand
for M1 balances, when interest rates have changed, it has been hard to estimate
how M1 was changing relative to the public’s demand for it. The additional
observations made possible by the passage of time could make this econometric
problem manageable in the absence of sweep accounts. As Figure 4 shows, the
variations in M1 velocity are related to the cost of holding it. In time, it might
be possible to estimate again a reliable M1 demand function. In the future,
with a high degree of substitutability between shares in bond and stock mutual
funds and the time deposits in M2, a narrow aggregate like M1 could well be
more stably related to the public’s expenditure than M2.
Computer technology is making it easier to avoid the tax imposed by
noninterest-bearing reserve requirements. In principle, the Fed could solve the
problem by paying interest on required reserves. Such proposals were advanced
in discussions of the 1980 Monetary Control Act, but they were politically
unacceptable. Alternatively, the Board of Governors could reduce reserve re-
quirements. It is, however, limited by the legal minimum reserve requirement
of 8 percent.     
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Figure 4 Annual M1 Velocity and the Opportunity Cost of Holding M1
















M1 Velocity (left scale)
Cost of Holding M1 (right scale)
+ Notes: M1 velocity is nominal GDP divided by M1. The opportunity cost of holding M1 is the
six-month commercial paper rate minus a weighted average of the rates paid on the components
of M1 (zero for currency and demand deposits).
Depending upon where “swept” funds are placed, sweep accounts can re-
duce measured M1 or M2. To an extent, the kind of shift-adjustment proposed
here could reduce the resulting mismeasurement of the monetary aggregates.
However, the data necessary to make such adjustments are never likely to
be complete and are available only with a lag. Bank intermediation bears the
burden of a large variety of regulations not imposed on other forms of ﬁnancial
intermediation. It seems likely that in the future the ability to deﬁne monetary
aggregates that are useful for monetary policy will depend upon whether banks
have a continuing incentive to adapt to special taxes and regulations.
5. SUMMARY
The growth of mutual funds that began in earnest in 1978 has increasingly
directed ﬁnancial intermediation away from banks and directly into the money
and capital markets. Initially, growth occurred in money market mutual funds.
Because shares in these funds are redeemable at par, they could be included
in the deﬁnition of M2. Redeﬁned to include money market mutual funds, M2
retained its long-run stable relationship with nominal output. Beginning in the
mid-1980s, growth in mutual funds has been concentrated in bond and stock
mutual funds. Because shares in these funds exhibit ﬂuctuation in capital value,
they cannot be included in an expanded deﬁnition of M2 in a satisfactory way.   
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In the early 1990s, the combination of (1) low rates of return on bank
deposits relative to capital market instruments and (2) the decreased cost of
operating bond and stock mutual funds diminished the public’s demand for
saving in the form of bank deposits. M2 velocity rose as depositors redirected
savings from time deposits to bond and stock mutual funds. In principle, a
shift-adjusted M2, deﬁned as M2 plus cumulative dollar inﬂows into bond and
stock mutual funds, could maintain the same relationship to the public’s dollar
expenditure as conventional M2. The shift-adjustment, however, accounts for
only about half of the unusual rise in M2 velocity that began in 1991. The
remainder to the rise in M2 velocity is probably caused by the use of bank
time deposits to purchase stocks and bonds directly and to make tax-sheltered
investments.
APPENDIX A
CONSTRUCTION OF SHIFT-ADJUSTED M2
Tables 3, 4, and 5 detail the construction of shift-adjusted M2 from the
Investment Company Institute (ICI) data contained in the monthly release
“Trends in Mutual Fund Activity.” As shown in Table 3, the ﬁrst step is
to subtract redemptions (including exchanges out of bond and stock mutual
funds) from sales (including exchanges into bond and stock mutual funds but
excluding reinvested dividends) of mutual funds to derive total net inﬂows.
Subtracting net inﬂows due to institutions and net inﬂows into IRA/Keogh
accounts then yields the net inﬂows due to households that are assumed to be
coming out of deposits in M2. These net inﬂows are cumulated and added to
conventionally deﬁned M2 to derive shift-adjusted M2. Unfortunately, there
are no direct measures of net inﬂows due to institutions or of net inﬂows into
IRA/Keogh accounts. Tables 4 and 5 explain the derivation of these two series.
ICI publishes ﬁgures on the dollar values of institutional and IRA/Keogh
accounts. Dollar inﬂows into these accounts can be calculated by subtracting
capital gains from the changes in their dollar value. The capital gains (losses)
for these accounts are assumed proportional to the capital gains (losses) for
all types of mutual fund accounts. Figures on the level of mutual fund assets
held in IRA/Keogh accounts are available monthly, while the ﬁgures for insti-
tutional accounts are only available for December of each year. Therefore, it





























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1984 1 15.49 9.61 5.88 1.39 1.11 3.38
2 13.84 9.12 4.72 1.74 1.00 1.97
3 16.05 8.91 7.14 2.19 1.22 3.72
4 15.69 11.54 4.15 1.20 0.69 2.26 11.33
1985 1 24.35 12.48 11.87 2.01 2.03 7.84
2 32.36 13.41 18.95 3.64 3.29 12.02
3 35.22 15.86 19.36 4.58 1.69 13.09
4 44.11 16.17 27.94 8.07 2.74 17.13 50.08
1986 1 58.92 22.51 36.41 11.06 5.53 19.82
2 66.67 31.67 35.00 11.85 5.83 17.32
3 68.40 37.13 31.26 11.00 2.89 17.38
4 74.54 39.18 35.36 13.03 2.67 19.66 74.18
1987 1 94.17 46.57 47.60 10.66 7.10 29.84
2 76.20 68.37 7.83 0.35 7.31 0.16
3 61.88 63.99 −2.11 −2.99 0.63 0.25
4 48.03 69.61 −21.58 −8.16 −1.29 −12.13 18.12 
 
1988 1 42.03 44.65 −2.62 −1.12 0.87 −2.37
2 41.28 44.83 −3.55 −1.33 0.43 −2.64
3 30.87 40.02 −9.14 −2.78 0.82 −7.19
4 33.23 41.09 −7.86 −2.41 0.49 −5.94 −18.13
1989 1 37.06 42.27 −5.21 −1.36 −0.52 −3.34
2 41.99 39.52 2.47 0.79 1.24 0.44
3 44.48 39.98 4.50 1.58 1.81 1.11
4 49.10 41.96 7.14 2.22 1.96 2.96 1.17
1990 1 52.58 45.73 6.85 4.63 4.36 −2.14
2 51.98 40.77 11.21 5.88 3.15 2.18
3 45.77 46.96 −1.19 1.64 0.44 −3.27
4 44.80 40.34 4.46 2.87 −0.46 2.04 −1.17
1991 1 61.82 45.87 15.95 5.87 1.95 8.13
2 71.68 48.53 23.16 9.41 4.83 8.92
3 77.92 46.27 31.65 10.42 4.72 16.51
4 94.14 58.12 36.01 12.75 6.84 16.42 49.98
1992 1 115.06 70.03 45.02 19.17 5.38 20.47
2 106.57 62.33 44.25 18.00 10.30 15.95
3 113.12 69.04 44.07 17.54 9.49 17.04
4 119.03 79.17 39.85 15.08 10.32 14.46 67.92
1993 1 148.38 87.61 60.77 27.15 12.90 20.73
2 150.13 88.99 61.14 28.35 12.58 20.21
3 161.92 98.02 63.90 30.02 7.26 26.62
4 171.71 114.01 57.70 29.41 8.42 19.87 87.43
Notes: All data are from the Investment Company Institute. Sales include exchanges into stock and bond mutual funds; redemptions include exchanges out




Table 4 Aggressive-Growth Stock Funds
Net Inﬂows into IRA/Keogh Accounts, 1991
Millions of dollars














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 December 63287.3 2180.7 18528.3
1992 January 65474.8 2187.5 1555.3 632.2 19425.1 896.8 187.6 709.2
February 68050.4 2575.6 1872.0 703.6 19426.0 0.9 200.9 −200.0
March 66136.0 −1914.4 1050.4 −2964.8 19691.8 265.8 −882.8 1148.6
April 65941.1 −194.9 1075.0 −1269.9 19547.4 −144.4 −376.4 232.0
May 67847.9 1906.8 951.1 955.7 19844.0 296.6 279.5 17.1
June 66295.1 −1552.8 430.2 −1983.0 19292.7 −551.3 −577.1 25.8
July 69545.6 3250.5 812.1 2438.4 20205.9 913.2 708.5 204.7
August 67472.7 −2072.9 −214.7 −1858.2 19507.6 −698.3 −537.2 −161.1
September 68160.4 687.7 414.7 273.0 19608.1 100.5 78.5 22.0
October 72134.5 3974.1 543.3 3430.8 20769.8 1161.7 987.8 173.9
November 78842.4 6707.9 2753.9 3954.0 22596.5 1826.7 1133.2 693.5
December 83365.3 4522.9 2276.0 2246.9 23893.3 1296.8 644.0 652.8     
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Table 4 illustrates the estimation of net inﬂows into IRA/Keogh accounts
for aggressive-growth stock mutual funds. We repeat these calculations for
the other 18 categories of bond and stock mutual funds in order to arrive
at aggregate data. Column (1) of Table 4 lists monthly ﬁgures for the dollar
value of all aggressive-growth funds, and column (2) shows changes in
column (1). Column (3) shows monthly net inﬂows into aggressive-growth
funds. Capital gains (4) are the difference between the change in dollar value
in column (2) and net inﬂows in column (3). Column (5) lists the monthly
dollar values of aggressive-growth funds held in IRA/Keogh accounts, and
column (6) shows changes in (5). Column (7) shows estimated monthly capital
gains of IRA/Keogh accounts. It is derived by multiplying capital gains for all
aggressive-growth funds from column (4) by the percentage of all assets held in
IRA/Keogh accounts, which is column (5) divided by column (1). The resulting
capital gain for IRA/Keogh accounts (7) is then subtracted from the change
in the dollar value of IRA/Keogh accounts in column (6) to derive a monthly
ﬁgure for the net inﬂow into aggressive-growth funds held in IRA/Keogh ac-
counts, which is shown in column (8). Summing these ﬁgures across all types
of mutual funds yields the ﬁgure in column (5), Table 3.
Table 5 illustrates the estimation of net inﬂows into institutional accounts.
Part 1 shows year-end ﬁgures for the dollar value of total and institutional
aggressive-growth funds. Column (c) shows the percentage held in institutional
accounts. In Part 2, column (1) shows the dollar value of total aggressive-
growth funds. The dollar amount held in institutional accounts, column (3), is
estimated as the product of column (1) and the fraction held in institutional
accounts, column (2), interpolated from the ﬁgures shown in column (c), Part
1. Column (4) shows monthly changes in these ﬁgures. Column (5), which
is copied from column (4) of Table 4, shows capital gains for all bond funds.
Capital gains for institutional accounts, column (6), is estimated by multiplying
capital gains for all accounts, column (5), by the percentage of assets in institu-
tional accounts, column (2). Net inﬂows into institutional accounts, column (7),












1991 December 63287.3 21035.0 33.2%































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1991 December 63287.3 33.2% 21035.0
1992 January 65474.8 32.9% 21537.9 502.9 632.2 208.0 294.9
February 68050.4 32.6% 22152.1 614.3 703.6 229.0 385.2
March 66136.0 32.2% 21302.5 −849.6 −2964.8 −955.0 105.3
April 65941.1 31.9% 21014.0 −288.5 −1269.9 −404.7 116.1
May 67847.9 31.5% 21389.3 375.4 955.7 301.3 74.1
June 66295.1 31.2% 20672.8 −716.5 −1983.0 −618.4 −98.1
July 69545.6 30.8% 21448.3 775.5 2438.4 752.0 23.5
August 67472.7 30.5% 20578.0 −870.3 −1858.2 −566.7 −303.6
September 68160.4 30.2% 20554.4 −23.6 273.0 82.3 −106.0
October 72134.5 29.8% 21505.8 951.5 3430.8 1022.8 −71.4
November 78842.4 29.5% 23235.8 1729.9 3954.0 1165.3 564.6
December 83365.3 29.1% 24283.3 1047.5 2246.9 654.5 393.0            
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is the difference between the change in the dollar amount in column (4) and
capital gains for institutional accounts, column (6). Summing across all types
of mutual funds yields the aggregate net inﬂow ﬁgure used in column (4),
Table 3.
Because mutual fund data are end-of-month ﬁgures while M2 data are
daily-average ﬁgures, the end-of-month ﬁgures are averaged to derive the
monthly mutual fund data series.
APPENDIX B
AN ESTIMATED M2 DEMAND REGRESSION
The estimated M2 demand regression below uses shift-adjusted M2 for the years
1991, 1992, and 1993. It is a regression of percentage changes in real M2 on
a dummy for the Korean War, percentage changes in real GDP, a contempora-
neous and lagged value of changes in the ﬁnancial market opportunity cost of
holding M2, and second differences of percentage changes in nominal output.
The last term is an estimate of the nominal rate of return on physical assets,
which is used by Friedman and Schwartz in their money demand regressions.
See Friedman and Schwartz (1982, Sec. 6.6.3) and Hetzel (1992). Estimation
of the following regression using shift-adjusted M2 rather than conventionally
deﬁned M2 results in a reduction of the overprediction of real M2 of 23 percent
in 1991, 55 percent in 1992, and 47 percent in 1993.
M2 Demand Regression, 1950 to 1993
∆ln rM2t = −3.0 ∗ Korea + .93 ∆ln rGDPt − 1.1 ∆(Rt − RM2t)
(2.9) (11.9) (4.8)
−1.2 ∆(Rt−1 − RM2t−1) − .51∆2 lnGDPt + ˆ et
(4.5) (6.3)
CRSQ = .64 SEE = 1.6 DW = 1.4 DF = 39
Notes: Observations are annual averages. M2 is shift-adjusted for the years 1991, 1992, and
1993. rM2 is per-capita M2 deﬂated by the implicit GDP deﬂator. rGDP is real per-capita gross
domestic product. R is the four- to six-month commercial paper rate expressed as a decimal.
RM2 is a weighted average of the own rates of return paid on components of M2. Korea is a
shift dummy with a value of one in 1951, 1952, and 1953 and zero otherwise. Before 1959, M2
is M4 in Table 1 of Friedman and Schwartz (1970). From 1991 on, M2 includes inﬂows from
households into non-IRA/Keogh bond and stock mutual funds. ln is the natural logarithm and ∆
the ﬁrst-difference operator. CRSQ is the corrected R-squared; SEE the standard error of estimate;
DW the Durbin-Watson statistic; and DF degrees of freedom. Absolute value of t-statistics are in
parentheses. Estimation is by ordinary least squares.    
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